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Abstract – Return migration is the positive counterpart of brain drain. Human capital accumulation 
increases in a country if skilled agents go back home after a period spent working abroad. Effects of 
brain drain in Italy could be negative as highly skilled migrants decide not to come back to their 
native country. Our simple model shows that if preference for home consumption is balanced by 
career opportunities and life-style conditions, agents leave Italy and prefer to remain abroad. Data 
support and policy implications are provided. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Return migration is the flow of migrants who come back to their home country after a period spent 
in a foreign country for activities usually related to job or human capital accumulation. When it 
occurs as the resulting phenomenon from a brain drain migration, human capital accumulation of 
the country of origin increases in time as highly skilled agents come back and import their abilities. 
The propensity to return in the country of origin after a period spent abroad varies among countries, 
and the percentage of migrants who return within 10 to 20 years is between 25% and 30% of the 
initial group (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). This kind of migration is 
especially  concentrated  among  the  highly  educated  agents,  who  are  often  among  the  most 
successful of them (Johnson e Regets, 1998; Luo and Wang, 2002; Commander et al., 2004; Gundel 
and Peters 2008; Batista et al., 2007; Zucker and Darby, 2007). 
Propensity to return of Italian highly skilled workers has been revealed very low as results from 
empirical findings reported in a statistic investigation by Monteleone and Torrisi (2010). This paper 
builds a theoretical model which fits this evidence, showing that Italian return migration suffers 
because of certain structural conditions of the labor market. The provided explanations of these 
results suggest policy implications in sight of more adequate human capital accumulation.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief overview about return migration literature; 
section 3 presents the model which shows theoretical support of low propensity to return of Italian 
agents; section 4 provides some policy implications and section 5 provides conclusion.  
 
 
2.  Return migration 
 
Effects of  brain drain  are described  in  literature either as  negative or positive according to the 
highlighted prevailing factors of this phenomenon. In fact, some prefer to consider only effects on 2 
 
labor market, giving insights of negative impact. More recent contributes suggest, instead, to give 
more  weight  to  human  capital  accumulation,  underlining  positive  aspects  on  economic  growth 
(Carrington and Detragiache, 1998; Bein et al., 2003; Commander et al., 2003; Giannoccolo, 2006; 
Monteleone, 2010). 
Bhagwati  and  Hamada  (1974)  explain  that  economic  integration  of  markets  and  consequent 
migration implies a net loss for poorer countries, both in productive and in fiscal terms, given that 
more specialized workers (and therefore those with higher potential salaries) move away.   
Haque and Kim (1995) suggest that brain drain affects negatively long-term income, given that 
reduces the internal human capital accumulation rate and increases migration rates from countries 
that remain unprovided of qualified workers.  
Mountford (1997) acts as a watershed between supporters and opponents of brain drain. In fact he 
highlights how positive on economic growth the chance to gain higher wages for workers can be: 
because of uncertainty he holds that emigration rates would remain within an acceptable range, 
giving  the  chance  to  stimulate  education  diffusion.  This  stream  of  literature  assumed  in  years 
increasing weight, as demonstrated considering Vidal (1999), Bein, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), 
Docquier and Rapoport (2009), among others. 
Therefore return migration is the main positive consequence of brain drain. The return gives, on one 
hand, to an agent the chance to improve skills and to gain higher wages; on the other hand, to the 
country  of  origin,  the  possibility  to  increase  its  stock  of  capital  accumulation  and  to  ignite 
educational externalities which lead to a more specialized work force. 
As a matter of fact, who migrate aiming to return, has the opportunity to accumulate human capital 
in the host country during the period of emigration, through a process of learning by doing, and then 
disseminate this new knowledge in the country of origin (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003).   
Mayr and Peri (2008), note that agents from richer countries (East Europe, Asia and Latin America) 
have a greater tendency to migrate and to return home compared to ones from poorer countries 
(Africa).  The  same  view  is  suggested  by  Dustmann  and  Weiss  (2007),  who  argue  that  agents 
emigrated from countries in EU, America, Australia and New Zealand, mainly return home after a 
period, while emigration from India and Africa assumes substantially permanent characterization. 
In  particular,  they  focus  on  migrants  from  UK  and  say  that  migration  is  temporary:  strongly 
temporary among highly skilled workers.  
Return migration seems valid for most European countries but Italy. Because of the lack of statistic 
observations about Italian brain drain (and therefore about the potential return migration associated 
to it), our model tries to fit empirical findings of Monteleone and Torrisi (2010) who provides 
important empirical result about brain drain in Italy. Italian highly-qualified agents show a very low 
propensity to return back home. In their empirical work, these authors build a sample of 350 highly-
skilled  academic  qualified  Italian  agents  who  decided  to  migrate  to  follow  job  opportunities. 
Responses from the interviewees give an interesting profile of the agents who leave Italy: they are 
aged between 31 and 40 years, mainly they are assistant professor and work in public universities. 
An important finding is a sort of "delay" suffered by Italian agents compared to their colleagues in 
developed countries with regard to age related to career progression. Over 70% of  interviewed 
revealed a low or no propensity to return to Italy. This result confirms the intuition stated above 
about the permanent character of Italian emigration: who migrates is not willing to return to Italy 
after a period spent abroad. Reasons behind migration and no return propensity have revealed to be 
mainly: 
-  scarce availability of research funds; 
-  either scarce or not meritocratic career opportunities; 
-  lack of adequate infrastructures; 
-  very low wage structure and therefore life-style limitations; 
-  environment not sufficiently stimulating. 
The model will show that with these characteristics in the academic job market, return migration to 
Italy is absent. 3 
 
3. A simple model with no return migration 
   
We consider the productive life of an agent, and for sake of simplicity we neglect uncertainty about 
future wages and costs of migration. There exist two countries in the world, Italy (Home country – 
H) and the destination country (Foreign country – F). Time ) (t is assumed to be continuous between 
0  t   (moment  of  decision  to  emigrate)  and  T t  (moment  of  death):  therefore  we  neglect 
retirement issues, because agents will work all life long. Wages in home and foreign countries are 
denoted by 
H w  and 
F w . Wages are function of time spent working in a country. It is realistic that 
workers earn increasing salaries, as time passes. Wage in host (home) country is a function of time 
spent working abroad,   (at home,     T ). We assume that  ) (
F F w w   with   0 ) (    d dw
F , 
and  ) (
H H w w   with    0 ) ( ) (    d dw
H . As the sample revealed, we consider that the initial 
condition which inspires the migration decision is that  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
H F w w  . Interviewed sample reveals 
that,  at  least  as  perception,  high-skilled  post  graduate  workers  find  that 
        d dw d dw
H F ) ( ) (  .  This  is  associated  with  the  idea  of  a  true  and  very  strong 
correspondence between effort and wage dynamics of foreign careers in the academic sector, which 
inspire much of the reduction of Italian migrated workers’ propensity to return. 
Worker’s lifetime utility function is  
 
(1)        dt t c u dt t c u U
H T H F F )] ( [ )] ( [





 represents a preference weight between home and foreign consumption. Interviewed workers of 
the sample propend to show a value of   less than one. This descends from the feelings that high 
skilled Italian academic workers showed: they think their foreign life-style and job-conditions are 
better than those they had in Italy. This make life (i.e. consumption and therefore utility) abroad 
preferable compared to domestic one. Even those among them who previously worked in Italy, and 
found opportunity to leave, left. This proves that there exists a basic reason of little satisfaction in 
domestic job condition, along with the case that the interviewed people face scarce possibility of 
career and too little evidence of skill/productivity-based careers in Italy. Furthermore, given the 
greater human capital accumulation of individuals in the sample, it is reasonable to expect that these 
persons are  more open-minded and thus  less reluctant to build their  lives  in a  foreign country. 
Generally speaking, the stronger the opportunity on foreign job market – relatively to the domestic 
one, the higher the life-style attainable abroad, the lower the appreciation for consumption at home, 
the lower the propensity to return. All of this explains why    eventually represents the propensity 
to return. Imposing that  1    would explain strongly why workers prefer not to return. We assume 
that  1   . However,    will not drop out the formulas because a general implication even for 
1    will be provided. Since we assume no discount for sake of simplicity, and considered that 
marginal utility of consumption is assumed to be decreasing, this implies that during both sub-
periods of time (time spent abroad and time spent at home) consumption levels will be constant. 
Thus, eq.(1) can be written as 
 
(1’)          ) ( ) (
H F c u c u U      
 
where 
H c and 
F c are the optimal constant flows of consumption, at home and abroad, and therefore 
lifetime utility of agents is determined as the sum of two products, each referred to the period of 
time spent abroad and in the home country. 
Utility function in each sub-period is assumed to be  
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with  1   ,  H F j ,  .  
The lifetime budget constraint is 
 
(3)           
H F T H F pc c dt t w dt t w Y    


       ) ( ) ( ) (
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) ( Y is the lifetime income and  p is the home to foreign consumption relative price, 
F H p p p  . 
The decision of migration is inspired by the occurrence of a lower or no wage in the home country.  
The maximization of (1’) subject to (3) leads to  
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Moreover, posing that 1  p (considering the case of Italians going in other industrialized country, 
the hypothesis that home consumption is cheaper/more expensive than foreign one would not be 
always realistic), one could get 
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Immediately, from eq. (4), and given the eq. (2), it results 
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Solving eq. (5) and eq. (3) we gain the optimal values of consumption: 
 




















The  sample  reveals  that  initial  hypothesis  [ ) 0 ( ) 0 (
H F w w  ]  explains  why  high  skilled  workers 
move away. This explanation is supported by the comfortable feelings in reaching job opportunities. 
High skilled Italian academic workers enjoy abroad chances that in Italy they did not find. First of 
all, in order to check if they prefer not to return, consider how lifetime income evolves with respect 
to  . It means to evaluate the first derivative of eq.(3) w.r.t.  : 
 




















Consider eq. (7) for how it evolves while    tends to T: i.e. if agents decide to remain abroad. 
Assuming  that  wage  dynamics  is  constantly  increasing  in  time,  at  home  and  abroad,  i.e. 
k dt t dw  ] ) ( [ (as widely found in literature, for example in Jacobson et al., 1993 and in Ljungqvist 
and Sargent, 1998) the integral in the r.h.s. of eq. (7) becomes  
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whose limit for  approaching T is zero 
 





As  initially  assumed,  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
H F w w  ,  and  given    0 ) (    d dw
F ,  then  0 ) 0 ( ) (  
H F w w    and 
thus, eq. (7) is increasing in  and positive. The latter conclusion is immediately verifiable as one 
can show that  
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Lifetime income then rises as  grows: this represents the income incentive for no return.  
Secondly, we question how lifetime utility is affected by time spent working abroad.  
Differentiating eq. (1’) w.r.t.  yields 
 
(9)               ) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 )( (
1   

 Y c u c u
d
dU F F     
 
which is positive if  1 0    . It still remains positive for some positive (not “too big”) values of 
 and further research will be conducted to show the turning point.  
Thus, we can conclude that time spent working in the foreign country not only does provide higher 
wage from the beginning, but also increases utility, and thus reduces propensity to return as time 
passes.  
This model explains evidence of data from a theoretical perspective. Of course, results would be 
reversed if conditions of preference about location of consumption or purchasing power of income 
were changed. Abandoning features of the Italian sample, and more generally, for higher positive 
values  of   ,  the  model  does  not  describe  the  experience  of  individuals  in  the  sample,  who 
expressed feeling of satisfying life-style and job conditions. In this case, the model would vest in 
more weight to consumption at home. The same rationale is behind the assumption that wage in 
Italy does not depend on foreign work experience. This condition has been imposed because it is 
typical for Italian academic job market: there is not any additive merit to those who started working 
abroad. Another important issue is that this model can explain exceptions derived from any form of 
“patriotism”: very high values of    can revert results even for extremely advantageous foreign 
wage dynamics.  
 
 
4. Some policy implications. 
 
Italian brain drain phenomenon appears to be a consequence of a structured set of problems which 
engrave  on  the  Italian  scientific  research.  Among  the  causes,  there  exists  a  severe  lack  of 
infrastructures and adequate equipments, scarcity of funds for research (which sometimes appear to 
be assigned in a non meritocratic way), and the extremely low wage level compared to standards in 
other countries. Responsibilities of this situation, are eventually due to the extremely low attention 
that many Governments (independently of any political orientation) dedicated to Italian Academic 
system and to public research development, which did not assumed any strategic role in the long 
term path of the country. Part of the responsibility  lies also on the private sector of  firms and 6 
 
entrepreneurs,  because they  did  not show to understand the relevance of  investments  in public 
research as well. Consequences of this state of the art are, first of all, the loss of prestige and 
competitiveness at international scale that Italy risks to face. Secondly the impoverishment in terms 
of human capital. As a third aspect, the country could become less attractive in terms of scientific 
careers  for distinguished  foreign researchers who could give  important insights to the domestic 
academic  sector.  Fourthly,  courses  and  educational  supply  of  universities  could  reveal  neither 
attractive nor competitive for international students.  
In order to avoid the realization of these predictions some attempts have been done in 2001 with the 
creation of the first program for “brains return”, which established some advantageous novelties in 
stipulating academic contracts with Italian scientists who had been working abroad for at least three 
years. One of these novelties was the commitment for a strong correspondence between salaries 
given  in  Italy  and  European  standards;  another  was  the  appointment  for  more  advanced 
infrastructures dedicated to those who would accept to return. Unfortunately, as Ziguras and Law 
(2006) showed, this kind of policy does not seem effective, and the Italian case did not represent an 
exception to their conclusions. Furthermore it must be noted that since 2006 the program has been 
stopped  due  to  the  lack  of  funds.  Moreover,  one  should  argue  that  if  return  policies  are  not 
associated to sector-specific development policies, there exists the chance to attract just less active 
researchers which could find convenient to return for familiar o personal reasons. 
In 2003 guide lines for the foundation of the Italian Institute of Technology (IIT) were given. This 
institute should have been dedicated to the applied research in technology, mainly for industrial 
applications. But, as Saxenian (2001, 2002 and 2005) underlined for Taiwan, China, and India, the 
creation of a national research bureau requires important investments. Eventually these funds were 
absent in the Italian case.  
More recently, the situation of Italian Universities is worsened. The percentage of GDP dedicated to 
research has not been increased, Government has rather chosen to strongly reduce public spending 
for research and investment in the academic sector. This, again, amplifies brain drain instead of 
reducing it.  
There is not a unique magic recipe to solve once forever the problem. But a way out can be depicted 
as a process. First of all a new framework in educational system can be desirable as students could 
enter faculties with more basic knowledge, leaving the academic sector the role for giving them 
applications and scientific attitudes, instead to strengthen previous weak scholastic curricula. This 
aspect is particularly relevant because otherwise young Italians will not be competitive in an always 
more educated European job market. Secondly, enrolment procedures for academic careers may 
find new solutions to select more profitable work force. Thirdly, research needs experience but also 
young force and enthusiasm. Therefore, the incentive to focus on the lowering of the average age 
for academic personnel is strong: usually the more experienced agents can cover leading roles, but 
the younger can hold more dynamic and well-paid positions. Fourthly, the existence of a strong and 
well visible link between academic research and firms innovation appears to be widely desirable. 
This could guarantee the existence of  funds  for research  for technical sciences as  much as the 
possibility to raise funds for humanistic research, necessary for other non applied purposes.  
Last  but  not  least,  economic  treatment  of  professors  is  a  key  note  in  all  of  this  framework. 
Academic personnel is often made by people who severely dedicated their younger years to study. 
This individuals must find opportunities to gain what they deserve: chances to demonstrate their 
value  before  entering;  chances  to  grow  in  their  career  after  they  find  their  job.  Productivity-
measurement system must be implemented to make Italian academy  more efficient and profitable 
at the same time, both for researchers and society.  
There is the need to build new incentive structure for academic workers and a more stimulating 
environment to ensure that Italian possibilities to express scientific excellence return to be the basis 




5. Concluding remarks. 
 
This  paper  aimed  to  provide  a  general  theoretical  model  to  explain  empirical  findings  by 
Monteleone-Torrisi (2010), of low propensity to return for Italian brain drain. Basic reasons are 
related  to  the  structural  form  of  academic  labor  market  in  Italy.  The  idea  that  wage  and  job 
opportunities in this sector are not affected by time and human capital improvements gained abroad 
is the deep reason for no return. Emigrants experience highly productive job environments, career 
opportunities  and  better  wages.  Such  aspects  abate  utility  from  home  consumption,  and  are  so 
strong  and  so  deeply  felt  to  induce  Italian  academic  workers’  commitment  in  fading  out their 































A - OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION VALUES: 
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